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#1401 fleebah

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Posted 03 April 2012 - 10:20

Hvað með þetta?
Reyndar ekki nýjar fréttir með þörungana en þetta virðist vera vænlegra en repjuolían því undir hana þarf svo gífurlegt landsvæði til að anna innlendri eftirspurn að einhverju marki.

Þörungar geta leyst af innflutt eldsneyti

Lífeldsneyti má framleiða úr þörungum í slíku magni að komi í staðinn fyrir innflutt eldsneyti. Orkusparandi ljósdíóðutækni og aðgangur að jarðhita gera aðstæður hér til framleiðslunnar einstakar. Hægt væri að flytja út lífeldsneyti.

Sérstakar aðstæður hér á landi gætu gert hagkvæma framleiðslu lífeldsneytis úr stórþörungum, eða þangi. Að sögn Ásbjörns Torfasonar, framkvæmdastjóra Vistvænnar orku ehf. gæti eldsneyti sem framleitt væri með þessum hætti komið í stað alls innflutts eldsneytis og er því eftir nokkru að slægjast. „Ísland gæti meira að segja komist í þá stöðu að flytja út eldsneyti sem framleitt væri hér innanlands,“ segir hann.

Fyrirtækið hyggur á sýnatöku í sumar þar sem leitað verður að hentugum svæðum til þörungaræktunarinnar. „Við auglýstum eftir líffræðingum í þessa vinnu og höfum fengið margar góðar umsóknir frá mjög hæfu fólki,“ segir Ásbjörn. Í framhaldinu væri svo hægt að hefja tilraunaræktun á hafi úti á völdum stöðum á landinu.

Erlendis eru hafnar tilraunir með vinnslu á lífeldsneyti úr þörungum, svo sem hjá fyrirtækjum á borð við Statoil, DuPont og Novozymes. Skortur á hentugum svæðum hamlar hins vegar ræktun og nýtingu ytra, sem og aðgangur að orkukostum til eftirvinnslu þar sem hitaskiljun yrði notuð til að vinna lífeldsneyti úr þörungunum.

Hér segir Ásbjörn ýmsa ákjósanlega staði þar sem setja mætti upp verksmiðju í nágrenni þörungaræktunarinnar. Til dæmis mætti horfa til jarðvarmavirkjana á Reykjanesi, sem og á Norðurlandi, á Þeistareykjum og við Kröflu.

Vænlegasta kostinn telur Ásbjörn að tengja framleiðsluna við þann mikla hita sem fá mætti með djúpborunarverkefnum, en einnig væri hægt að nýta fyrirliggjandi aðstöðu til framleiðslu við lægra hitastig.

Úr þaranum er hægt að framleiða nokkrar tegundir af eldsneyti, svo sem lífgas, bioetanól og svo biobutanól sem sé mjög líkt bensíni. Síðan megi líka hafa not af hliðarafurðum framleiðslunnar og nota til dæmis í dýrafóður eða sem áburð.

Vistvæn orka hefur náð árangri með þróun á ljósdíóðutækni sem notuð er við lýsingu í gróðurhúsum við margvíslega ræktun. Með tækninni hefur verið hægt að draga verulega úr orkunotkun við ræktunina, eða um helming eða meira miðað við hefðbundna lampa sem notaðir eru við ræktunina.

Þessa tækni segir Ásbjörn svo lykilinn að árangri sem ná megi í þörungaræktun. „Hún er þessi litla þúfa sem veltir þessu þunga hlassi,“ en tilraunir fyrirtækisins við þararæktun hófust þegar erlent stórfyrirtæki í fiskeldi leitaði til Vistvænnar orku um lýsingu fyrir ungplöntur.

Hér heima hefur fyrirtækið þegar, í samstarfi við Nýsköpunarmiðstöð Íslands og Atvinnuþróunarfélag Norðurlands, hafið tilraunir með ræktun á Reykjum í Ölfusi í gróðurhúsi Landbúnaðarháskóla Íslands. „Á því stigi framleiðum við ungplöntur,“ segir Ásbjörn, en þegar þær hafa náð þeirri stærð að þær þola flutning þá eru plönturnar fluttar í sjó þar sem þær fá bæði næringu og sólarljós.

Með þeirri tækni sem Vistvæn orka hefur þróað við framleiðslu á ungplöntunum er hægt að framleiða mjög mikið magn af þörungum og tryggja þannig þá magnuppskeru sem þarf úr sjó til að standa undir framleiðslunni.

Miðað við það magn af eldsneyti sem flutt var til landsins árið 2011 segir Ásbjörn að miðað við norska útreikninga þyrfti tvær milljónir tonna af lífmassa til að framleiða samsvarandi magn af lífeldsneyti. „En það er algjörlega raunhæft að rækta þetta í þessu magni,“ segir hann og vísar til þess að erlendis sé þegar í gangi stórfelld stórþörungaframleiðsla, bæði til framleiðslu á lífgasi og svo jafnvel til manneldis líka. „Í tilraun í Noregi voru menn að fá svona 40 til 50 tonn af þurrvigt úr hverjum hektara.“


"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
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Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1402 appel

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Posted 04 April 2012 - 02:09

Margar góðar hugmyndir til um framleiðslu á orku. Gallinn er ávallt sá sami, hvernig á að koma þessari orku til skila. Bæði vantar dreifikerfi og svo jú auðvitað bílaflotann sem á að nýta þessa orku. Oftast eru svona "grænir" bílar alveg rándýrir. Nýjir bílar kosta bara of mikið í dag fyrir meðal-Jón. Svo þegar þú bætir ofan á það einhverjum nýjungargjörnum orkugjöfum, t.d. vetni, metan eða rafmagni, þá tvöfaldar þú verðið á bílnum, þannig að fólksbíll kostar einsog hálft einbýlishús. Fyrir mitt leyti þá er það ekki bensínið sem er dýrast við bílinn, heldur bara bíllinn sjálfur, viðhald á honum og jú tryggingar. Bensín... ég kaupi kannski fyrir 200 þúsund á ári, 16-18 þús á mánuði. Dugar mér. Ekki mjög stór kostnaðarliður fyrir mig. Þannig að ég er ekki að fara kaupa bíl á 10 milljónir bara útaf því að hann brennir þörungum.
Frelsi frá stjórnvöldum ER frelsi!
Frelsi, velmegun og friður!

#1403 kadlinn

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Posted 04 April 2012 - 23:28

Butanol má nota á bensínvélar án nokkurra breytinga.

#1404 Fjalldrapi

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Posted 05 April 2012 - 14:45

Eru engin vandamál með að breyta bensínhákum fyrir hálfa milljón þannig að þeir geti notað metan ? Einhver talaði um að álag væri á kælikerfið, það skapaðist meiri hiti...?
Það er náttúrulega bara ein stöð uppi í Ártúnshöfða með metani, eru þær fleiri, ein á Akureyri ? Það tekur víst dágóða stund að fylla á kútana.

#1405 jukn

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Posted 05 April 2012 - 15:01

Það er náttúrulega bara ein stöð uppi í Ártúnshöfða með metani, eru þær fleiri, ein á Akureyri ? Það tekur víst dágóða stund að fylla á kútana.

Það á að vera ein í Hafnarfirði líka

#1406 Vinni

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Posted 05 April 2012 - 17:08

Veit einhver hér hvað kostar að búa til vetni sem er jafngildi eins líters af bensíni? Eða hvað það þarf mörg wött til þess?

Fann svarið hér.
http://uk.answers.ya...17124022AANICYK

[...] so you could presumably get 1 litre of pure hydrogen for 240 watts in 1 and 1/3 minutes.

Nú er ég alveg blautur bak við eyrun í rafmagnsfræðum hvað varðar útreikninginga en ég ætla að reyna:
Ef það tekur 80 sekúndur að framleiða 1 líter af vetni, og 240 wött, þá eru framleiddir 45 lítrar á klst og það þarf 10.800 wött til þess.

kílówattstundin er á uþb. 12 krónur í dag. 10,8 kwst kosta tæplega 130 kr. Þá kostar 130 kr. að framleiða 45 lítra af vetni eða 2,9 krónur per líter.

Nú veit ég ekki hvað orkuinnihald vetnis er mtt. bensíns en ef það er álíka mikið þá sýnist mér að vetni sé bara ansi góður kostur.

Þessi bútur sem þú vitnar til á líklegast við um framleiðslu á einum lítra af vetnisgasi nærri standard aðstæðum. Ekki rugla því saman við 1. lítra af fljótandi vetni. Útreikningarnir í uppafi svarsins eru síðan rangir og mér sýnist lítið á því að byggja yfirleitt.

Samkvæmt Wikipedia er algeng (réttara sagt góð) nýtni við að búa til vetni með rafgreiningu 50-75% og til að búa til 1.kg af vetni þarf 50-79 Kwh (kílóvattstundir). Notum bara 60Kwh/kg til gamans. Og notum þessar 12 kr/Kwh ..

60x12=720kr.

Til að bera þetta saman við t.d bensín þá er orkan í 1.kg af vetni ~123MJ en í 1.kg bensíni er orkan verulega minni, eða ~47MJ.
Þar sem bensín er selt í lítravís þá er þægilegra að nota 34MJ per lítra. Heimild
123/34~=3,6
Fyrir þessar 720 kr fáum við semsagt vetni sem hefur sama orkuinnihald og 3,6 lítrar af bensíni.
Það gerir sirka 200kr á lítra.

Ágætt að hafa í huga að raforkuverð til massaframleiðslu á vetni væri væntanlega talsvert lægra. Síðan er það spurning hvernig á að nýta vetnið í bílnum, hvort um er að ræða brunahreyfil með svipaða nýtni og þessir hefðbundnu, eða vetnissellu með mun hærri nýtni. Ef raforkuverðið er helmingi lægra og nýtnin á vetninu tvöföld á við það sem gerist í bensínvélum þá gætum við verið að tala um ígildisverð ~50kr á lítra á móti bensíni.

*Þetta er snöggsoðið innlegg og gæti breyst ef ég rekst á vitleysur.

Edited by Vinni, 05 April 2012 - 17:10.

=^..^=
In 1787, shortly after the close of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, a woman interested in the proceedings approached Benjamin Franklin. "Well, doctor," she asked, "what have we got, a republic or a monarchy?" The venerable champion of American liberty replied, "A republic, madame, if you can keep it."
Zerohedge

#1407 left

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Posted 05 April 2012 - 20:18

The End of the Saudi Oil Reserve Margin

Riyadh is less and less able to cushion supply shocks as it consumes more and more of its own oil.

By JIM KRANE

Doha, Qatar

President Obama's sanctions plan on Iran follows an old Mideast policy playbook. Western moves against an oil-exporting country take place with the cooperation of Saudi Arabia. U.S. strategy requires the Saudis to ramp up production and replace Iranian exports in hope of avoiding a damaging spike in prices.

It's a familiar scenario: At one time or another, the Saudis have been called upon to replace exports from Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and, most recently, Libya. The idea is to have your cake and eat it—to meet U.S. foreign policy goals without disrupting oil markets and antagonizing the American motorist.

But the old playbook may have to be torn up. This time Saudi Arabia is struggling to assume its usual role as the oil market's swing supplier. This can be seen in current market tightness and in U.S. gasoline prices, which are edging toward $4, a dangerous prospect at election time.

The Obama administration's sanctions plan acknowledges Saudi weakness. Rather than try to impose a blanket ban, it has introduced piecemeal measures, such as encouraging China and South Korea to demand discounts for continued imports of Iranian crude. For the first time, Saudi Arabia's vaunted spare capacity appears insufficient to cover the loss of a major exporter.

When revolution last year took Libya's 1.5 million barrels a day off the market, the Saudis and other producers were able to fill the gap. A slack oil market helped. But Iran has been exporting roughly 2.2 million barrels a day. And now something else is afoot.

Saudi Arabia isn't the same depopulated petro-state that the West found itself so dependent on in the 1970s. The kingdom and its oil-rich neighbors have seen their populations and industrial bases swell. They have become huge consumers of their own energy. The ruling sheikhs have cemented themselves in power by erecting energy-driven welfare states which provide some of the world's cheapest electricity, natural gas and gasoline.

With domestic electricity demand rising 10% per year in Saudi Arabia, the kingdom now devours more than a quarter of its oil production—nearly three million barrels per day. International Energy Agency figures show that Saudi Arabia now consumes more oil than Germany, an industrialized country with triple the population and an economy nearly five times as large.

In the medium-term, Saudi Arabia is in danger of losing its all-important "reserve margin" of oil production that so often calms market volatility. Loss of this spare capacity would remove a crucial safety mechanism from the global economy, to say nothing of tying America's hands when it comes to future moves against oil states.

Longer-term, the kingdom's very exports are at risk. A projection by Jadwa Investment of Riyadh shows that, at current rates of consumption growth, the Saudi reserve margin will dwindle until it disappears sometime before 2020. At that point, the Saudis would begin diverting oil destined for export into the domestic market.

Following the trend further, Jadwa finds that Saudi Arabia will consume its entire production capacity of 12.5 million barrels per day at home by 2043. London's Chatham House finds that the kingdom will become a net oil importer even earlier, by 2038.

These projections don't take into account the possibility that Saudi Arabia's production could rise above an expected plateau of 13 million barrels a day, or that ruling sheikhs might stop encouraging their citizens to waste energy by dropping some of the world's deepest fossil-fuel subsidies.

As U.S. drivers are now learning, however, the Gulf countries have limited ability to increase production beyond current capacity, and they show even less ability to curb their domestic demand. When it comes to competition for supply, they will retain a natural advantage. They own the supply.

America's Middle East confrontations have long depended on Saudi spare capacity. Without it, as the faceoff with Iran already shows, Washington—and the world—will be less free to intervene in the region without raising gasoline prices at home. And unless the Gulf Arab monarchies can gain control of their own consumption, their role in global energy markets will dwindle, as prices grow even more volatile.

Wall Street Journal
Úllen dúllen doff
kikke lane koff
koffe lane bikke bane
úllen dúllen doff.

#1408 Fjalldrapi

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Posted 05 April 2012 - 20:57

Er vetnisdraumurinn búinn ? Það vildi hann meina þessi :
Nú er lag fyrir okkur Íslendinga að henda peningunum í vitleysu
Framtíðarlausn á orkumálum heimsins
Orkumál á villigötum
Er mönnunum alvara ?
Vetnishálmstrá

Í fyrstu greininni segir að 75 til 80 % af orkunni sem hlaðið er í vetnið sóast.
Er það ekki líka svo að hinn "gamaldags sprengihreyfill" skilar einungis fjórðungi af orkunni úr bensíntanknum útí hjólin ? Heyrði eðlisfræðiprófessor segja það í útvarpinu.

80 % sóun ?

Edited by Fjalldrapi, 05 April 2012 - 20:57.


#1409 Hlynzi

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Posted 07 April 2012 - 09:48

Í fyrstu greininni segir að 75 til 80 % af orkunni sem hlaðið er í vetnið sóast.
Er það ekki líka svo að hinn "gamaldags sprengihreyfill" skilar einungis fjórðungi af orkunni úr bensíntanknum útí hjólin ? Heyrði eðlisfræðiprófessor segja það í útvarpinu.
80 % sóun ?

Þetta er rétt með venjulegan mótor, gríðarleg sóun á orkunni sem fer öll meira og minna í viðnámshita, afhverju helduru að við setjum olíu á mótorinn ? Eingöngu til að lækka núningsviðnám innra með honum. Diesel bílarnir hafa ögn betri nýtni.
http://en.wikipedia....gine_efficiency

Ég hef ekki kynnt mér þetta nákvæmlega varðandi vetni, en flestir orkumiðlar hafa gríðarlegt tap í för með sér. Mest hissa var ég samt á hversu kjarnorka, eða eldsneytið (svosem uranium) er illa nýtt.
Hlynur S. - HlynurHs@hotmail.com (MSN)



#1410 fleebah

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Posted 07 April 2012 - 22:11

Following the trend further, Jadwa finds that Saudi Arabia will consume its entire production capacity of 12.5 million barrels per day at home by 2043. London's Chatham House finds that the kingdom will become a net oil importer even earlier, by 2038.

Þetta er eitt af þeim atriðum sem að Chris Martenson sagði að við þyrftum að fylgjast meira með, ekki bara framleiðslutölum olíu heldur einnig hversu mikið af olíu olíuríkin flytja (eða flytja ekki) út og hvaða hlutfall af eigin framleiðslu þau fara að nota sjálf.

Þessi þróun margfaldar hækkun á olíuverði. Og því þeim mun mikilvægara að finna aðra orkugjafa til samgöngunotkunar en olíu.

Já, og takk fyrir þetta innlegg, Vinni. Merkileg lesning.

Edited by fleebah, 07 April 2012 - 22:12.

"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
- Skeggi -
Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1411 Claudius

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Posted 10 April 2012 - 23:03

Olíuríkin hafa aukið innanlandsnotkun sína hratt síðustu ár þannig að á meðan olíuframleiðsla hefur nokkur vegin staðið í stað síðan 2005 hefur olíuútflutningur farið minnkandi. Og útflutningur til annarra en Kína og Indlands hefur auðvitað minnkað enn hraðar. Þannig að hvað varðar okkur og aðrar vesturlandaþjóðir, sem þurfa að flytja inn olíu, er peak oil staðreynd.
Rakst á þessa mynd sem sýnir þróunina
Posted Image


Það er keimlík þróun sem gerist í vanþróaðri olíuríkjunum, íbúunum er boðið upp á hræódýra orku þannig að innanlandsnotkunin vex ört. En gamanið kárnar þegar olíuvinnslan fer að dala. Það hefur t.d. verið að gerast í Egyptalandi, sýrlandi og Yemen og á örugglega sinn þátt í óróleikanum í þeim löndum.
Hægt er að sjá nokkur dæmi hér:
http://en.wikipedia....port_Land_Model

Edited by Claudius, 11 April 2012 - 09:46.


#1412 jóhannes björn

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Posted 03 May 2012 - 00:31

At the latest Casey Research conference, respected investment analyst Porter Stansberry stood at the podium and predicted that the price of oil will fall below US$40 per barrel within the next 12 months. Part of his reasoning revolves around the impact that the shale gas revolution has had in the United States – he believes a similar thing will happen with oil.
Porter is a friend of mine and a very smart, successful individual… but I think not.

From my perspective, the pressures at play in the oil market are all pushing prices in the opposite direction: up. Global supplies are tightening, costs are rising, and demand is not falling. Prices are going to remain high, and then go higher. And there will not be a shale oil revolution anytime soon.

I'm the kind of guy who puts his money where his mouth is, so I challenge Porter to a bet. I bet Mr. Stansberry that the price of oil will stay above $40 a barrel over the next 12 months. The wager? 100 ounces of silver.
Porter has made a lot of good calls in his career. I highly recommend watching his video The End of America, an interesting and entertaining look at his prediction that the US will soon drown in its debts and cease to be a global economic powerhouse, a transition that will lead to riots across the country.
Porter and I agree on a lot of things, but on this one he's wrong. Below are my top ten reasons that high oil prices are here to stay.

Reason 1: "The Big Pinch"
Oil production levels, as well as exports, have been falling in most of the world's top ten supplier nations:



The "Seven Sisters of Declining Exports" – Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, the UAE, Norway, Venezuela, and Kuwait – share one common characteristic: their oil fields are old. Oil fields don't produce the same amount year after year. They decline significantly from one year to the next because each barrel of oil taken from a reservoir reduces the pressure within the field, leaving less force available to push the next barrel of oil up the well. But don't take our word for it. The following chart shows production from Alaska's North Slope oil field in the past 30 years:



http://www.caseyrese...f=CRX449ED0512A




Posted Image

(Click on image to enlarge)


Another example? The Cantarell field in Mexico, which produced 2.1 million barrels per day in 2003, produced just 400,000 barrels last month, a staggering decline of more than 80% in just nine years.
To maintain output levels, producers need to consistently invest huge amounts of money and time in exploration, development of new areas, and engineering and utilizing new technologies to extend oil field lifespans. All of this costs money, and lots of it. Of the Seven Sisters of Declining Exports, six are countries where the oil machine is run by a national oil firm. That means that revenues from oil exports belong to the government… and those governments are stuck between a rock and a hard place.

They know they need to direct the oil revenues back into their fields very soon, before they decline beyond the point of repair. In the meantime, production levels continue to fall. Compounding the problem of declining production is the fact that most of these countries have long relied on cheap domestic fuel prices to keep their citizens happy. This has spurred rising consumption in many oil-producing countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Nigeria, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Kuwait.

With domestic consumption climbing and production falling, these countries have less oil available for export every year. But here's the hard place: oil export monies make up the vast majority of each government's revenue. They need to sell oil on the international market in order to fund their day-to-day operating expenses. And their operating expenses are sky high: these governments constantly make new social-spending promises to appease their masses; and since their populations continue to grow, these commitments grow larger with each passing day.

Venezuela is a prime example. Hugo Chávez owes a big chunk of his popularity to the domestic fuel subsidies that render fuel prices in Venezuela among the lowest in the world – it costs just US$0.18 per gallon to fill up in Venezuela, and that's ridiculously expensive compared to the US$0.05 per gallon it cost a year ago. Yes, that means you could have filled your car for $1 in Caracas.

Getting rid of these fuel subsidies would solve part of the problem, but it is simply not doable – it is not just political suicide, but a sure-fire way to incite riots and social unrest. Just a few months ago Nigeria's government tried increasing domestic gas prices; the country rapidly descended into violence as protestors demanded a return to subsidized fuel. The government relented within days.

Fuel subsidies are not the only expensive item on many a government's social-spending list. Housing, food, health care, education – these are all burdens that socialist-tending governments take on to cement support. Social spending is a great way to make yourself popular with your citizens, but it is also a great way to bankrupt your country… unless, of course, you can sell oil at high prices to other countries. According to our analysis, OPEC nations need the price of oil to stay above $60 per barrel to pay for all their social programs. In other words, they need $60+ oil to stay in power – and you can be certain they will do everything necessary to make sure this happens.

To sum it up: Governments in most of the world's key oil export nations need more money from fewer barrels of oil, and it is a lot easier to hose your international customers than your own citizens. This results in "The Big Pinch."
What is "The Big Pinch?" In simple terms:

Declining production + increased domestic demand = Less oil available for export

But…

Revenues from oil exports must at least remain stable, if not increase, to meet domestic budget needs

Therefore…

Oil export prices must increase.


Reason 2: Natural Gas and Oil – Different Markets, Different Outlooks

Natural gas and oil are both hydrocarbons, and analysts frequently discuss the two as if they are one and the same, but they are very different commodities with completely separate market mechanics. To summarize: oil is a global commodity while natural gas is a regional commodity.

Natural gas can only travel via two methods: through pipelines and as liquefied natural gas (LNG). Engineers have come a long way in building pipelines that traverse thousands of miles or run underneath bodies of water, but pipelines are still limited in their usefulness – we're never going to build a pipeline from Norway to Japan, for example. The only way to transport natural gas across oceans is as LNG.
In its gaseous form, natural gas takes up far too much room to ship economically, so LNG is natural gas that has been condensed to liquid state. On conversion into a liquid the volume shrinks to just 1/600 of its original size, making it economic for transportation. Unfortunately these liquefaction plants easily take several years and billions of dollars to build. Also, not all gas-hungry countries can take LNG – they must have a regasification facility that accepts the LNG, turns it back into a gas, and sends it through pipelines to consumers.

Many energy-hungry countries, such as Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, have built the necessary infrastructure and are taking all the LNG they can get their hands on. Their competition for LNG cargoes has driven LNG prices far above basic natural gas prices. A quick comparison: Japanese natural gas trades at $16.8 per MMBTU, whereas Henry Hub trades at just $2.11.

What does this mean? Countries with natural-gas-liquefaction facilities are able to get top dollar for their gas in the global market, while countries without LNG capabilities are at the mercy of regional supply and demand.
What about the United States? The United States has no LNG liquefaction plants – the last operating facility, the Kenai plant in Alaska, closed in 2011. This means that the flood of shale gas production in the US will continue to overflow storage facilities and depress US natural gas prices, because domestic demand is not rising as fast as production and there is no other way to get the gas to customers across the oceans who want it.

Oil, however, is a very different story. A barrel of oil produced in Saudi Arabia can be shipped to the United States and sold on that market. This means that if oil cost $10 in Saudi Arabia and $50 in United States, some enterprising business would take oil from Saudi Arabia, ship it to the United States, and sell it for a profit. Of course, the real picture is a bit more complicated than that. Prices do differ somewhat from place to place – Western Canada Select crude, for example, currently sells for $88.98 per barrel, while Brent Crude is priced at $119.17 per barrel – but such divergences simply reflect the costs and constraints of transportation and the range of crude-oil qualities. The general idea is that oil is a global product. As such, dramatic increases in supply in one part of the world can be sold off elsewhere in the global market, creating much less impact on the producing region than with regionally constrained natural gas.

This means that while a rapid increase in natural gas production pummelled gas prices in North America, the same would not happen to oil prices in North America or elsewhere if US oil production suddenly jumped.

An example might help put things in perspective. US natural gas production grew by 30% in the past five years due to the shale gas revolution. If US crude oil production grew by 30% overnight, that would add three million barrels a day to global production. Even though this sounds like a lot of oil, it would represent just 4% of the global supply.

World crude oil production rose 4% from 2003 to 2004. What happened to the price of oil?

It increased by 34%.

Reason 3: Natural Gas is Not Oil

One of the main arguments Porter uses to support a falling price of oil is that the world's newfound abundance of natural gas is providing an alternative fuel for the future. While there is some truth to that statement, there are more caveats than certainties.
There is no way natural gas will replace even a fragment of oil demand during the time frame in question, which is the next 12 months. Oil is entrenched as the world's mainstay fuel; gas has always been second or third on the list of energy-
resource importance. Changing the ordering on that list will take decades, if not generations. How many natural gas fueling stations do you drive past on your way to work? Not many, I'd bet, especially compared to the number of gas stations in your neighborhood. Do you see that ratio changing much in just 12 months?

In addition, it's easy to forget that we rely on oil for far more than just fuel. Look around you – chances are good that at least half of the items you see from wherever you're sitting include at least some oil. We use oil for concrete, shingles, pipes, ink, synthetic fabrics, crayons, computer cases, carpet, paint, Styrofoam, shampoo, helmets, electrical insulation, toothpaste, lipstick, tires, rope, fertilizer, candles, adhesives, refrigerants, artificial turf, pill capsules, soft contact lenses, shaving cream, antifreeze, antihistamines, insecticides, fan belts, hand lotions, caulking, golf balls, credit cards, Formica, footballs, bandages, medical tubing, packing tape, and many, many more items.

Oil is a deeply ingrained part of how our world operates, and demand will continue to rise with population for many decades to come. It will take many years for natural gas to even start to supplant oil as the dominant fuel.

Natural gas will play a growing role in the world's energy scene, but the timeframe for the shift is very long. Twelve months from now natural gas prices in North America will still be depressed and global oil demand will be almost the same as it is today.

Reason 4: My Country, My Oil

I believe we are in the early stages of the "Decade of Resource Nationalization." As supplies tighten, natural resources of all kinds will become more and more valuable. Whether to control additional revenues or to secure domestic supplies, governments will nationalize natural resources with gusto.

The latest example of this is Argentina. A beautiful country with incredible geological potential, Argentina's resources are wasted on a government that is simply unable to incentivize private investment in the country. Now the government is going to try to develop its technologically challenging oil fields alone, and mark my words it will fail.

On April 16, 2012, Argentine President Cristina Kirchner said her government would seek approval from Congress to take a 51% government stake in the YPF, the largest oil producer in the country. Until that announcement, YPF was majority-controlled by Spanish firm Repsol, which just months ago announced the discovery of almost a billion barrels of recoverable resources in the Vaca Muerta ("Dead Cow") formation in Argentina's Neuquen province. The nationalization of YPF is very unfortunate for Repsol, which has seen its share price decline dramatically since the announcement, but it is just as unfortunate for all the Argentineans who will not see any oil revenues now that Kirchner has turned the "Dead Cow" into "dead shale."

YPF may be the first casualty in Kirchner's oil and gas nationalization spree but it will not be the last, as there is widespread enthusiasm within Argentina for further expropriation and nationalization within the sector. Today's enthusiasm will become tomorrow's disappointment as Argentineans taste the bitter reality that government resource nationalization almost always ends badly.

Kirchner is nationalizing Argentina's oil sector directly, but lots of resource nationalization is done in much more roundabout ways. These devious methods include: increasing the tax levied on oil production (United Kingdom); introducing a windfall tax (Ecuador); or suddenly adding capital-gains tax to sales of oil projects (Uganda). In all these cases, the governments wound up with more money while the oil companies and their investors got stuck with the bill. "Big bad oil companies" are frequently made the bogeyman, but in reality profit margins for oil production keep getting slimmer and slimmer – and the real bogeyman is often a greedy government.

Whether a government is direct or covert about its desire to nationalize its resources, the results are the same for global resource explorer-developers: increased risk. It doesn't take long before the risk-reward balance becomes skewed toward risk and companies begin to pack up and leave.

Guess where that leads? To lower production volumes and higher prices.

Reason 5: "Shale Revolution" – A Purely North-American Phenomenon

Porter argues that a global shale oil revolution could push production volumes way up and prices way down, but this argument assumes the world has the infrastructure to power such a revolution. That is simply wrong.
It is not easy to drill an economic shale well, whether for oil or gas. To get the most out of a shale formation, an operator often needs to use a high-power – over 25,000 horsepower – frac drill set. He has to drill horizontally, which is far more technical and challenging than drilling vertically, and then has to complete multiple fracs to get the well flowing.

North America has more energy infrastructure than anywhere else in the world, resulting from years of conventional oil and gas development and production. In North America it is relatively easy to find drilling companies armed with these high-power frac sets, but such is definitely not the case in most other parts of the world. Europe, for example, is home to fewer than one-tenth the number of drilling and fracking sets as there are in North America. That means any shale revolution in Europe would take a very long time to develop –the equipment and expertise just aren't there.

Yes, shale gas production ramped up quickly in North America, but we had the infrastructure in place and just needed to adapt it to a new kind of geology. The head start means North America is now more than a decade ahead in a sector that Europe has just begun to understand, and one that Russia still refuses to believe.

It is safe to say that it will take a very long time for the shale revolution to have a major impact in Europe and elsewhere. In the best-case scenario, we believe Europe will only have a small amount of shale production of any type twelve months from now.

Reason 6: The Easy Oil Is Gone and Shale Oil Wells Decline in a Big Way

The IEA estimates it costs between $4 and $6 to produce each barrel of oil from the conventional fields in Saudi Arabia and Iraq, including capital expenditures. Algerian, Iranian, Libyan, and Qatari fields cost slightly more, at about $10 to $15
per barrel. These countries produce most of their oil from relatively easy, straightforward, conventional deposits.

My perspective on energy resources revolves around the fact that there are no more of these big, easy deposits to be found. The deposits of tomorrow are harder to find and more complicated, expensive, and risky to develop. Companies now have to manage the litany of challenges inherent in getting oil out of places like the oil sands, sub-salt deposits, and ultra-deep offshore reservoirs.

With increased difficulty comes higher production costs. This also means that if oil prices fall too low, costs will overwhelm revenues and production will shut down altogether.

The Canadian oil sands are a perfect example. Producing projects in the oil sands need an oil price of at least $60 per barrel to remain economic – and that assumes capital costs have already been repaid. To build a new oil sands project, a producer needs to believe prices will remain high enough to cover not only his basic production costs but also to repay his huge capital outlay. As such, new oil sands projects are uneconomic to develop without an oil price of at least $85 per barrel.

The oil sands are by no means the only important oil region with high production costs. To access most of the world's unconventional oil resources, companies need to drill horizontally, which costs much more than drilling vertically. After drilling horizontally, producers have to frac the well in many stages to achieve commercial production. This means each well costs many million dollars, an expenditure that is not going to be economic at $40 oil.

What is more, these wells decline much more rapidly than conventional wells. Production from any well falls with each passing year, but with unconventional wells the decline can be dramatic. In fact, shale wells typically decline by more than 50% after their very first year. To maintain production, companies need to be constantly drilling and commissioning wells, a treadmill process that increases the production costs significantly.

In the world of unconventional production, companies are faced with a double whammy: they need to drill more wells than a conventional field would require; and each well is much more expensive. Companies are not going to bother with this challenge if low prices make it a money-losing endeavor. Once production begins to shut down, the world will panic and the price of oil will turn upward once again.

Reason 7: The World Is Always Hungry for Oil – and Oil Deposits

The world is not awash in oil. On the contrary – we produce only just enough oil to meet global demand. With the world's population growing every day demand continues to rise, making the balance ever tighter. Even the threat of major production cuts of the sort we just discussed – which would surface the moment the oil price fell to $85 per barrel – would be enough to send tremors through the global oil machine and push the price of oil back up.

It is not only traders who will react to push prices back up. Countries will jump at the chance to secure oil supplies on the cheap. You see, for the oil-needy nations of the world, having to constantly walk this supply-demand tightrope is far from ideal. Far preferable would be to control of enough oil deposits, at home and around the world, to meet national needs. With nation after nation coming to this realization, the race is on to secure energy supplies.

China is the biggest player in this arena. Armed with a massive bank account, the Chinese are seizing every chance they get to buy major deposits. If the price of oil starts to slide, as Porter suggests it will, the value of major oil projects will decline as well and the Chinese will act, buying up any reduced-price oil deposit they can find. Acquisition activity like that will push prices back up again, if for no reason other than that people will remember the finite and declining nature of our world's oil reserves.

I also think the starting gun has already gone off in the global race for uranium, but that's a story for another day.

Reason 8: A Falling Oil Price Means Big Chunks of Global Reserves Uneconomic

If exploration drills find an oil deposit, data from those drills are used to calculate a "resource estimate," which is a geologic best-guess of how much oil the formation holds. However, oil in the ground is not necessarily oil that will ever see the light of day. That's where the "reserve estimate" comes in. Reserves are an estimate of the amount of oil within a deposit that can be extracted economically.

Let's look at both of those words: "extracted" and "economically." Whether oil from a deposit can be extracted depends on the geologic parameters of the deposit and the technical abilities of today, which combine to determine how much of the deposit is "technically recoverable." Then the "economically" part of the description comes into play. Oil is only "economically recoverable" if the cost of production is less than the price of oil – put simply, the producer has to be able to make a profit.

Remember, my outlook on energy resources is based on the premise that most of the easy deposits are gone. In general, only the hard-to-find and expensive-and-complicated-to-produce deposits remain. Producers cannot make money from these challenging deposits if oil is cheap, which means reserves will revert to being uneconomic resources.
Examples abound. It costs far more to produce a barrel of oil from the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, Canada's oil sands, Russia's Arctic waters, Estonia's oil shales, or Brazil's deepwater sub-salt deposits than from the big, conventional oil fields of yesterday, like those in Texas or Saudi Arabia. Oil reserves in these places will evaporate if oil prices fall and render them uneconomic to develop. The world's oil resource count will remain the same, but resources are useless if we can't get them out of the ground.

The world uses a lot of oil. All of that oil has to come from our finite pool of oil reserves. A falling oil price would gradually eliminate that pool, because the cheap oil is gone. And that simply doesn't stand up to supply-demand logic.

Reason 9: Between the Lines – By-products

One reason that North-American gas producers continue to drill select wells is because certain shale reservoirs contain lots of Natural Gas Liquids (NGLs). These liquids, comprised of bigger carbon molecules than the methane that is natural gas, trade at a significant premium to natural gas. Furthermore, these NGL-rich natural gas wells often also produce some oil.

The presence of these bonus products means producers in NGL-rich areas can continue to operate because revenues from the sales of by-product NGLs and oil compensate for rock-bottom natural gas prices. The result is upside-down – for these operators natural gas is still the primary product by volume but is the least-important product by value – and ironic, because by continuing to add to the natural-gas supply glut in North America their gas output is actually perpetuating the gas pricing problem. But the point is that the price of gas doesn't matter: as long as the NGLs and oil continue to flow out of these wells, the operator will remain profitable.

A similar paradigm does not exist in an oil well with natural gas as a by-product, because of course gas is worth far less than oil. If the price of oil began to fall dramatically, companies would simply stop drilling and there would be no upside-down by-product incentive to continue.

Reason 10: Black-Swan Events – The Fragile Supply-Demand Balance

A "black-swan" event is a rare but highly significant event with dramatic impact. The collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Arab Spring, and the Fukushima nuclear disaster are all examples of black-swan events.
These events tend to tilt more in favor of a rising oil price. Consider this: the loss of oil production from Libya – which represented just a small fraction of the world's production – caused the price of oil to move 25% in just two months.
As we have mentioned before, the world produces barely enough to satisfy global demand at the moment. That is precisely why any significant impact on the supply side generally shocks the market disproportionally.

And there are a good number of possibilities that could quite easily occur that would send the price of oil much higher: a war with Iran; OPEC reducing production levels; terrorist attacks in Nigeria; renewed social unrest in the Middle East… the list goes on. The point is: if something goes wrong geopolitically in the world, it is more likely than not that oil will begin shooting up.

And there you have it – ten reasons why the price of oil will not hit $40 a barrel in the next 12 months.
Porter, I respect your opinions and consider you a friend but, just like I took your money in our poker game, I look forward to laying my hands on your 100 ounces of silver, should you accept my challenge.

Edited by jóhannes björn, 03 May 2012 - 00:34.


#1413 fleebah

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Posted 03 May 2012 - 23:15

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uK367T7h6ZY


Liquid fluoride thorium reactor

Því meir sem ég les um þetta því meir sé ég að við erum að hafa áhyggjur út af engu. Olían er að hverfa en það er til nóg af stöffi til að taka við orkuframleiðslunni. Eins og t.d. Liquid fluoride thorium reactor.

Athyglisvert að lesa kaflann um "Economy and efficiency"

Thorium abundance. A LFTR breeds thorium into uranium-233 fuel. The Earth's crust contains about three times as much thorium as U-238, or 400 times as much as U-235. Thorium is about as abundant as lead. It is a byproduct of rare-earth mining, and is normally discarded as waste. Thorium currently (2011) costs only US$ 30/kg. In contrast, the price of uranium has risen above $100/kg, not including costs for enrichment and fuel fabrication. Using LFTRs, there is enough affordable thorium to satisfy the global energy needs for hundreds of thousands of years. Sufficient other natural resources such as beryllium, lithium, nickel and molybdenum are available to build thousands of LFTRs.

Reactor efficiency. Conventional reactors consume less than one percent of their uranium fuel, leaving the rest as waste. LFTR consumes over 99% of its thorium fuel. The improved fuel efficiency means that 1 tonne of natural thorium in a LFTR produces as much energy as 35 t of enriched uranium in conventional reactors (requiring 250 t of natural uranium),[4] or 4,166,000 tonnes of black coal in a coal power plant. The energy density is millions of times higher than any fossil fuel, with equivalent reductions in fuel mining and waste creation.

Edited by fleebah, 03 May 2012 - 23:33.

"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
- Skeggi -
Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1414 fleebah

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Posted 04 May 2012 - 00:18

Annað meira advanced video.

"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
- Skeggi -
Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1415 xcode

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Posted 05 May 2012 - 07:23

Þeir sem kynna svona patentlausnir verða alltaf að geta svarað spurningunni: Afhverju eru þið ekki búnir að búa það til?

Auk þess legg ég til að þrotabú bankanna missi undanþágu sína frá skattheimtu og verði skattlögð eins og önnur fjármálafyrirtæki

Auk þess legg ég til að lögfest verði að útgreiðslur úr þrotabúum séu í íslenskum krónum og útgreiðslu fari inná sérstaka reikninga í eigu kröfuhafa.  Einungis verður greitt úr þeim reikningum í gjaldeyri og einungis í gegnum sérstök gjaldeyrisuppboð Seðlabankans.  


#1416 fleebah

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Posted 06 May 2012 - 21:58

Það kom fram í þessu hjá honum, það hafa þegar verið byggðir tveir reactorar og starfræktir með ágætum. Annars er hérna ágætis fyrirlestur á TED um framtíðarpælingar.

"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
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Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1417 Agent Smith

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Posted 06 May 2012 - 23:42

Annars er hérna ágætis fyrirlestur á TED um framtíðarpælingar.


Ekki bara ágætis, heldur frábær fyrirlestur. Skemmtilegur húmor líka í kallinum þó ekki er ég viss um að allir fatti hann.

Frekar mögnuð pæling hjá honum að við komum ekki til með að sjá peak oil á næstu árum heldur peak demand, frekar áhugavert.

Edited by Agent Smith, 06 May 2012 - 23:43.

I'd like to share a revelation during my time here. It came to me when I tried to classify your species. I realized that you're not actually mammals. Every mammal on this planet instinctively develops a natural equilibrium with the surrounding environment but you humans do not. You move to an area and you multiply and multiply until every natural resource is consumed. The only way you can survive is to spread to another area. There is another organism on this planet that follows the same pattern. Do you know what it is? A virus

 

Good advice is always certain to be ignored, but that's no reason not to give it.

 


#1418 afleiða

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Posted 07 May 2012 - 01:00

Eruð þið búnir að gleyma því að Ísland 2002 - 2008 var hype-að upp sem ofursnjöll fjárfesting í International Banking. Hvað reyndust svo þessir þrír alþjlegu íslensku bankar vera þegar upp var staðið? Jú einn stór banki með þrjú höfuð en einn búk. Eitt stórt Ponzy píramída svindl skrýmsli. Í dag spretta upp fyrirtæki sem eru hype-uð upp og segjast kannski, hugsanlega og jafnvel líklega vera með framtíðar lausn á orkuvanda mannkynsins, eða hluta af lausninni. Maður spyr sig ávalt, er þetta enn eitt Ponzy svindlið, til að laða að fjármagn í miljarða vís? Thorium reactor? Hver veit, vondani að þetta sé það sem kemur fram í öllum þessum, vel útlistuðu mynskeiðum á netinu. En hvað segja hinir ofurlærðu, kjarneðlisfræðingar um Thorium reactors? Er einhver tímarammi kominnn á þetta. Hvað eru Japanir og þjóðverjar að hugsa í þessu sambandi? Fyrir utan allar hinar stórþjóðirnar, en eftir Chernobyl og Fugu Sima er kjarnorkan orðin mjög óvinsæl víða um lönd.

Edited by afleiða, 07 May 2012 - 01:05.

Where everyone in the house is crazy only the sane seem like fools.

#1419 fleebah

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Posted 08 May 2012 - 15:16

Þeir sem kynna svona patentlausnir verða alltaf að geta svarað spurningunni: Afhverju eru þið ekki búnir að búa það til?

Þetta er reyndar eftir allt ágætis spurning: Af hverju er ekki verið að nota þetta? Hvert er vandamálið?

"Maður vinnur hvorki dómsmál né rökræðu með yemenskum grátkór"
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Rökræður í hnotskurn: Confirmation bias


#1420 Plasma Rarity

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Posted 05 October 2012 - 08:13

http://epn.dk/branch...icle4863246.ece


Ruslands oliemirakel slutter snart



En ny økonomisk virkelighed venter russerne.



Rusland og præsident Vladimir Putins økonomiske model som i høj grad støttes af landets oliepenge står overfor en udfordrende fremtid.

Rusland har i årevis genereret overskud på handelsbalancen gennem landets salg af olie, og det har i mere end et årti hjulpet landet med at afbøde effekterne fra eksterne chok. '

Overskuddet ser dog nu ud til at forsvinde allerede i 2015, da idet importen står til at overgå olieeksporten, viser nye tal fra Ruslands centralbank, skriver CNBC.

- Dette bliver et helt nyt makroøkonomisk paradigme for et land, der har været vant til at leve med overskud, siger cheføkonom hos den Moskva-baserede investerings bank Renaissance Capital Ivan Tchakarov.

Kører ikke længere som smurt

Den russiske centralbank forventer, at overskuddet på betalingsbalancen falder fra estimerede 79,9 mia. dollar i 2012 til 25,2 mia. dollar i 2013, og at overskuddet i 2015 vil være vendt til et underskud på 8,8 mia. dollar.

Ruslands olie-drevne handelsoverskud, som i perioden fra 2000-2011 akkumulerede 4.500 mia. kroner (785 mia. dollar) svarende til mere end 40 pct. af landets BNP sidste år, har givet stormagten verdens tredjestørste valutareserve på omkring en 500 mia. dollar.

Derfor vil overgangen til en økonomi, hvor både det offentlige budget og handelsbalancen er negative, formentlig medføre en brat opvågning hos de russiske politikere, skriver CNBC.





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